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Practising mathematicians, consciously 
or not, subscribe to some philosophy of 
mathematics (if unstudied, it is usually 
inconsistent).  (Monk, 1970:707.) 
Abstract 
Accounting for primitive terms in mathematics 
The philosophical problem of unity and diversity entails a 
challenge to the rationalist aim to define everything. Definitions 
of this kind surface in various academic disciplines in 
formulations like uniqueness, irreducibility, and what has 
acquired the designation “primitive terms”. Not even the most 
“exact” disciplines, such as mathematics, can avoid the 
implications entailed in giving an account of such primitive 
terms. A mere look at the historical development of 
mathematics highlights the fact that alternative perspectives 
prevailed – from the arithmeticism of Pythagoreanism, the 
eventual geometrisation of mathematics after the discovery of 
incommensurability up to the revival of arithmeticism in the 
mathematics of Cauchy, Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor 
(with the later orientation of Frege, who completed the circle by 
returning to the view that mathematics essentially is geometry). 
An assessment of logicism and axiomatic formalism is followed 
by looking at the primitive meaning of wholeness (and the 
whole-parts relation). With reference to the views of Hilbert, 
Weyl and Bernays the article concludes by suggesting that in 
                                           
1 I want to thank two mathematicians – Proff. B. de la Rosa and H. Bargenda – for 
many valuable suggestions made during thorough discussions of the text of an 
earlier version of this article. 
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opposition to arithmeticism and geometricism an alternative 
option ought to be pursued – one in which both the uniqueness 
and mutual coherence between the aspects of number and 
space are acknowledged.  
Opsomming 
Die verantwoording van primitiewe terme in die wiskunde 
Die wysgerige probleem van eenheid en verskeidenheid bevat 
’n uitdaging vir die rasionalistiese strewe om alles te definieer. 
Hierdie tipe definisies kom in verskillende akademiese 
dissiplines na vore in formulerings soos uniekheid, on-
herleibaarheid, en wat bekend staan as “primitiewe terme”. 
Selfs nie die mees “eksakte” dissiplines, soos die wiskunde, kan 
daarin slaag om te ontkom aan die implikasies wat opgesluit lê 
in die rekenskapgewing of verantwoording van sulke primitiewe 
terme nie. Deur te let op die historiese ontwikkeling van die 
wiskunde word die feit belig dat alternatiewe perspektiewe 
deurlopend bestaan het – vanaf die aritmetisisme van die 
Pytagoreërs, die eventuele geometrisering daarvan ná die 
ontdekking van “inkommensurabiliteit”, tot by die herlewing van 
die aritmetisisme in the wiskunde van Cauchy, Weierstrass, 
Dedekind en Cantor (met die latere oriëntasie van Frege teen 
die einde van sy lewe toe hy die sirkel voltooi het met sy 
oortuiging dat die wiskunde wesenlik geometrie is). Met 
verwysing na die sienings van Hilbert, Weyl en Bernays word 
die artikel afgesluit deur die voorstel dat daar teenoor die 
erfenis van aritmetisisme en geometrisering ’n alternatiewe 
opsie ontgin behoort te word – een waarin sowel die uniekheid 
as die onverbreeklike wederkerige samehang tussen die 
getalsaspek en die ruimte-aspek erken word.  
1. Introduction 
Although every single academic discipline employs concepts, an 
explicit account of the nature of concept-formation is almost never 
encountered – in general the concept of a concept is absent. 
Normally key (or supposedly basic) concepts are defined 
straightaway. Every definition, however, has to use certain terms 
and this fact gives rise to questions such as: 
• Is it possible to define every one of the used terms? 
• Can this process be continued indefinitely or do we somewhere 
along the line encounter terms that cannot be defined any more? 
That an endless sequence of successive definitions merely results in 
the logical fallacy known as a regressus in infinitum has been 
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recognised by various disciplines.2 Ultimately every scholarly 
discipline therefore has to come to terms with its primitive terms, i.e. 
those terms that cannot be defined any further, but that constitute 
the inevitable building blocks for every definition. The rationalist 
ideal that everything should be defined, in this respect runs into the 
self-insufficiency of definition and concept formation, for ultimately 
the latter rests upon terms that are not defined and cannot be 
defined. 
How does one know these indefinable (primitive) terms? This is an 
epistemological issue that is rooted in philosophical assumptions 
about the world in which we live – and therefore involve ontological 
commitments. 
Surely there are multiple primitive terms – implying that this 
multiplicity of primitive terms brings to expression a fundamental 
diversity within reality. For this reason one should recognise the 
intimate connection between the problem of primitive terms and the 
problem of unity and diversity. The reverse side of this coin is also 
known as the problem of irreducibility, and is sometimes designated 
as complementarity. Hoyningen-Huene, for example, explicitly writes 
about irreducibility in the context of complementarity: 
But this property is just identical with the epistemological non-
reducibility of these features. In other words: in order to 
establish that in a certain situation complementarity prevails, it 
has to be shown that the features involved are irreducible to 
each other. (Hoyningen-Huene, 1991:67). 
Weingartner (1991:124) thus refers to primitive terms: 
Term (concept, idea) t is scientifically analysable if it is reducible 
to primitive terms. t is reducible to primitive terms if t is itself a 
primitive term or it can be traced back to primitive terms by a 
chain of definitions. 
2. Historical contours 
Within the history of philosophy this underlying issue of unity and 
diversity could be designated as the problem of the coherence of 
irreducibiles. 
                                           
2 Salmon, for example, refers to primitive terms in “pure mathematics” (Salmon, 
2001:32).  
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The basic orientation of Greek mathematics in its initial phase is 
succinctly captured by the Pythagorean statement: “everything is 
number”. The discovery of incommensurability by Hippasos of 
Metapont (about 450 B.C. – cf. Von Fritz, 1945) generated an 
emphasis on a new approach that attempted to consider our intuition 
of space as being more basic than that of number. Because intuition 
can grasp continuity at once “Greek mathematics and philosophy 
were inclined to consider continuity to be the simpler concept” 
(Fraenkel et al., 1973:213). During the later part of the 19th century 
mathematics once again reverted to an arithmeticistic perspective – 
a process initiated by Bolzano and carried through by Weierstrass, 
Dedekind and Cantor. 
What is amazing about this course of events is that what seemed to 
have been solved twice still turned out to form the centre of the 
problems involved, that is the discovery of irrationality 
(“incommensurability”) and the difficulties surrounding the theory of 
functions in Germany and France. Fraenkel et al. (1973:212-213) 
remark in this regard: 
… although the arguments have changed, the gap between 
discrete and continuous is again the weak spot – an eternal 
point of least resistance and at the same time of overwhelming 
scientific importance in mathematics, philosophy, and even 
physics.  
It is indeed amazing that the entire history of mathematics only 
explored the following two options: either reduce space to number or 
reduce number to space. It should be kept in mind that Frege 
eventually showed an affinity with the latter position. Dummett refers 
to Frege’s own “eventual expedient of reducing arithmetic to 
geometry” (Dummett, 1995:319). With regard to a preference for 
geometrical intuitions Wang (1988:203) writes: “An alternative 
course would be to consider our geometrical intuitions, as Plato and 
Bernays (and, I understand, also Frege in his later years) apparently 
preferred.” The intellectual development of Frege is indeed most 
striking in this context. In 1884 he published a work on the 
foundations of arithmetic. After his first volume on the basic laws of 
arithmetic was published in 1893, Russell’s discovery (in 1900) of 
the antinomous character of Cantor’s set theory3 for some time 
                                           
3 Russell considered the set C with sets as elements, namely all those sets A that 
do not contain themselves as an element. It turned out that if C is an element of 
itself it must conform to the condition for being an element, which stipulates that 
D.F.M. Strauss 
Koers 70(3) 2005:515-534  519 
delayed the publication of the second volume in 1903 – where he 
had to concede in the first sentence of the Appendix that one of the 
corner stones of his approach had been shaken. Close to the end of 
his life, in 1924/1925, Frege not only reverted to a geometrical 
source of knowledge, but also explicitly rejected his initial logicist 
position. In a sense he completed the circle – analogous to what 
happened in Greek mathematics after the discovery of irrational 
numbers. In the case of Greek mathematics this discovery prompted 
the geometrisation of their mathematics, and in the case of Frege 
the discovery of the untenability of his Grundlagen also inspired him 
to hold that mathematics as a whole actually is geometry: 
An a priori mode of cognition should therefore be involved in 
this respect. This cognition does, however, not have to flow 
from purely logical principles, as I originally assumed. There is 
the further possibility that it has a geometrical source.  
The more I have thought the matter over, the more convinced I 
have become that arithmetic and geometry have developed on 
the same basis – a geometrical one in fact – so that mathe-
matics in its entirety is really geometry (Frege, 1979:277). 
The obvious third option was never examined: accept both the 
uniqueness (i.e., irreducibility) of number and space and their mutual 
interconnectedness. In this article the focus will be on diverging 
mathematical positions caused by alternative accounts of the basic 
(“primitive”) elements shaping the direction which mathematics as a 
discipline took. 
3. Probing some foundational designs 
Although Euclid already employed the axiomatic method it received 
its modern rigour from Hilbert's work on the foundations of geometry 
(Grundlagen der Geometrie, 1922 [1899]). In this work Hilbert 
abstracts from the contents of his axioms, based upon three 
undefined terms: point, lies on, and line. 
3.1 The impasse of logicism 
Frege, Dedekind and Russell advanced a logicistic approach to the 
foundations of mathematics. Dedekind started from an actual infinity 
of “objects” within my Gedankenwelt (translated by Rucker with the 
                                                                                                                           
it cannot be an element of itself. Conversely, if C is not an element of itself, it 
indeed obeys the condition for being an element of itself! 
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descriptive term mindscape – Rucker, 1982:47). Russell defines 
number with the aid of his supposedly purely logical concept of 
class. The logical concept, he claims, enables the reduction of 
mathematics to logic. For example, the number “2” is “defined” in the 
following way:  
1 + 1 is the number of a class w which is the logical sum of two 
classes u and v which have no common terms and have each 
only one term. The chief point to be observed is, that logical 
addition of numbers is the fundamental notion, while 
arithmetical addition of numbers is wholly subsequent (Russell, 
1956:119). 
The irony, however, is that Russell already had to use the meaning 
of number in order to distinguish between different (“logical”) 
classes. After all, he speaks about the sum of “two” classes where 
each of them contains “one” element. This presupposes an insight 
into the numerical meaning of the numbers “1” and “2”! 
Consequently, the number “2,” which had to appear as the result of 
“logical addition,” is presupposed by it. In his discussion of number 
and the concept of class Cassirer displays a clear understanding of 
this circularity (cf. Casirer, 1953:44 ff.).4 
Although Dedekind asserts that the idea of infinity should form part 
of the logical foundation of mathematics, it soon turned out that the 
meaning of infinity precedes logic. Hilbert points out that in contrast 
to the early attempts of Frege and Dedekind he is convinced that as 
a precondition for the possibility of scientific knowledge certain 
intuitive representations and insights are indispensible and that logic 
alone is not sufficient.5 Fraenkel et al. (1952:182) also affirm: “It 
seems, then, that the only really serious drawback in the Frege-
Russell thesis is the doubtful status of InfAx,6 according to the 
interpretation intended by them”. Myhill (1952:182) mentions the fact 
that the axioms of Principia do not determine how many individuals 
there are: “... the axiom of infinity, which is needed as a hypothesis 
                                           
4 Singh (1985:76) also points out that Russell’s attempt makes him a victim of the 
“vicious circle principle”. 
5 “Im Gegensatz zu den früheren Bestrebungen von Frege und Dedekind 
erlangen wir die Überzeugung, daß als Vorbedingung für die Möglichkeit 
wissenschaftlicher Erkenntnis gewisse anschauliche Vorstellungen und 
Einsichten unentbehrlich sind und die Logik allein nicht ausreicht” (Hilbert, 
1925:190). 
6 InfAx = Axiom of Infinity. 
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for the development of mathematics in that system, is neither 
provable nor refutable therein, i.e., is undecidable”. 
Every attempt to derive the meaning of number from the meaning of 
analysis (or logic) is indeed faced with a vicious circle. Cassirer is 
also quite explicit in this regard. He claims that a critical analysis of 
knowledge, in order to side-step a regressus in infinitum, has to 
accept certain basic functions which are not capable of being 
“deduced” and which are not in need of a deduction.7 David Hilbert 
also points at this “catch 22” entailed in the logicist attempt to 
deduce the meaning of number from that of the logical-analytical 
mode. In his Gesammelte Abhandlungen Hilbert (1970:199) writes:  
Only when we analyze attentively do we realize that in 
presenting the laws of logic we already had to employ certain 
arithmetical basic concepts, for example the concept of a set 
and partially also the concept of number, particularly as cardinal 
number [Anzahl]. Here we end up in a vicious circle and in order 
to avoid paradoxes it is necessary to come to a partially 
simultaneous development of the laws of logic and arithmetic. 
3.2 Contradiction and the meaning of analysis 
The initial stage of mathematical set theory, as developed by Georg 
Cantor (between 1874 and 1899), got stuck in contradictions. By 
1895 Cantor himself discovered that his set theory contains 
anomalies. Cantor proved e.g. the proposition that for every set A of 
ordinal numbers an ordinal number exists which is greater than 
every ordinal number contained in the set. Consider, however, the 
set W of all ordinal numbers. Since this set is a set of all ordinal 
numbers, the foregoing proposition implies that an ordinal number 
exists which is greater than every ordinal number contained in W – 
but this is contradictory, since the set W supposedly already 
contains all ordinal numbers. A similar contradiction holds with 
regard to Cantor’s cardinal numbers (cf. Meschkowski, 1967:144-
145 and Singh, 1985:73). 
The ensuing axiomatisation of set theory, for example that of 
Zermelo-Fraenkel, proceeds on the basis of (i) first-order predicate 
                                           
7 “Denn die kritische Analyse der Erkenntnis wird, wenn man nicht einen 
regressus in infinitum annehmen will, immer bei gewissen Urfunktionen Halt 
machen müssen, die einer eigentlichen ‘Ableitung’ weder fähig noch bedurftig 
sind” (Cassirer, 1957:73). 
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calculus8 and (ii) it introduces as undefined term the specific set-
theoretical primitive binary predicate є which is called the 
membership relation (Fraenkel et al., 1973:23).9 This approach 
follows a general pattern: An axiomatic theory (axiomatic theories of 
logic excluded)  
... is constructed by adding to a certain basic discipline – usually 
some system of logic (with or without a set theory) but 
sometimes also a system of arithmetic – new terms and axioms, 
the specific undefined terms and axioms under consideration 
(Fraenkel et al., 1973:18). 
The first-order predicate calculus assumed by Zermelo-Fraenkel 
(ZF) contains a set of connectives enabling the expression of 
negation, conjunction, disjunction, conditional, biconditional and the 
two quantifiers: the universal quantifier (for all) and the existential 
quantifier (there exist). 
This means that the underlying logic provides ZF Set Theory with 
the following primitive symbols: connectives, quantifiers and, in 
addition, also variables. 
These connectives testify to the fact that the analytical mode is 
normed in the sense that it makes possible concept-formation and 
argumentation which may or may not conform to normative logical 
principles (such as the principle of identity, (non-)contradiction, the 
excluded middle, and so on). Negation makes it possible to assess 
illogical thinking and contradictions – a statement and its negation 
cannot both be true in the same context (at the same time). 
Negation as a connective presupposes the logical principles of 
identity and (non-) contradiction – in what is analysable A is A and A 
is not non-A. Thus analysis presupposes unity and multiplicity. First 
of all this relates to arithmetical phenomena. Therefore the logical 
principle of identity and that of non-contradiction analogically reflect 
this basic arithmetical meaning of unity and multiplicity. Whatever is 
                                           
8 Van Heijenoort (1967:285) remarks that “an axiomatization of set theory is 
usually embedded in a logical calculus, and it is Weyl’s and Skolem’s approach 
to the formulation of the axiom of separation that is generally adopted”. 
9 Note that within Zermelo-Fraenkel Set Theory (ZF) the terms “set” and 
“element” are synonymous (Fraenkel et al., 1973:24), implying that this theory 
will avoid the phrase “x is an element of y” (Fraenkel et al., 1973:23, note 2). 
Their terminology, in terms of the membership relation, is such that “x є y” is 
read as “x is a member of y” or as “x belongs to y” (which is synonymous with “x 
is contained in y” / “y contains x (as a member)” (Fraenkel et al., 1973:23). 
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given as a discrete unity (as being distinct) is identical to itself (the 
basis of the principle of identity) and is different from whatever it is 
not (the basis of the principle of non-contradiction) (cf. Strauss, 
1991). In themselves these two principles therefore (in a positive 
and negative way) reveal the coherence between two irreducible 
modal aspects of reality, namely the logical and the numerical 
modes. 
We may note that arithmetical addition differs from a logical 
synthesis – something already understood by Immanuel Kant. 
Where he argues for the synthetic nature of mathematical judgments 
in his Critique of Pure Reason (CPR), he clearly realises that pure 
logical addition (a mere logical synthesis) cannot give rise to a new 
number (cf. CPR, 1787:15 where he considers the proposition that 
7+5=12). In a different way Frege made the same point: abstraction 
directed towards concretely existing entities can only proceed to 
more abstract entities, but it can never result in the specification of 
any number as such. The logical addition of “ones” or “twos” cannot 
but end with the repeated identification of another number of the 
same kind: having identified a “two” and another “two” still provides 
us only with the “abstract” notion of “twoness”. Logical addition 
therefore cannot be equated with arithmetical addition. 
Likewise we have to distinguish between the kinematical notion of 
uniform flow (constant movement) and the physical meaning of 
energy-operation (causing certain effects, i.e. change/variation) on 
the one hand, and the idea of logical constants and variables on the 
other. 
In the context of the preceding remarks about the difference 
between logical addition and arithmetical addition it is worth noting 
that the presence of variables within first-order predicate calculus in 
yet another way also highlights the original meaning of number – but 
this time in coherence with the kinematical and the physical aspects. 
Physical changes presuppose constancy, keeping in mind that 
uniform motion (constancy) has a kinematical meaning, particularly 
surfacing in Einstein’s special theory of relativity where the velocity 
of light is postulated as being constant in a vacuum. 
The conditional as connective analogically reflects the physical 
cause-effect relation – if this then one can conclude to that. Weyl 
(1966:32) touches upon the relation between the (physical) 
relationship between cause and effect on the one hand, and ground 
and conclusion on the other, without realising that in this respect we 
encounter a basic concept of logic – one that analogically reflects 
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the coherence between the logical and the physical aspects of 
reality. The relation between logical grounds and conclusions 
reflects the original physical relation of cause and effect. He does 
realise that the logical relation may have its foundation in an 
applicable essential law, a “causal connection” or “an empirical 
regularity”, but nonetheless claims that the sign → “expresses a 
purely logical conclusion (Folge)” – without realising that the 
inevitability of employing this term Folge demonstrates the 
undeniable analogical link between the logical and the physical 
aspects of reality. 
In the footsteps of Plato and Galileo it became clear to modern 
physics and to Einstein that changes could only be detected on the 
basis of constancy, explaining the close connection of constants and 
variables also in logic.10 
Furthermore, the mere fact that both these terms appear in the 
plural makes it plain that the practice in logic to employ the terms 
constants and variables at once also presupposes the original 
quantitative meaning of number. 
3.3 Tacit assumptions of axiomatic set theory 
The first four axioms of ZF do not guarantee the existence of a set 
(or an object) at all (cf. Fraenkel et al., 1973:39, note 2). These 
Axioms are (Fraenkel et al., 1973:27-35):  
• The Axiom of Extensionality (if x d y and y g x, then x = y);  
• the Axiom of Pairing (for any two elements a and b there exists 
the set y which contains just a and b (i.e., a and b and no 
different member));  
• the Axiom of Union / Sumset (for any set a there exists the set 
whose members are just the members of the members of a);  
• the Axiom of Powerset (for any set a there exists the set whose 
members are just all the subsets of a).  
In addition to these four Axioms 
                                           
10 Weierstrass tried to eliminate the notion of variables through the postulation of a 
static infinite domain. 
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• the Axiom of Subsets and the Axiom of Infinity are introduced.11 
The Axiom of Infinity asserts explicitly that some set exists (cf. 
Fraenkel et al., 1973:39, note 2).12 
In the next part of the discussion some of the tacit assumptions of 
axiomatic set theory will be highlighted. 
• In the absence of a foundational ontological consideration of the 
interrelationships between the numerical, the spatial, the kine-
matical, the physical and the analytical aspects of reality an 
extremely fundamental circulus vitiosus is actually concealed by 
set theory and its logic.  
• Set theory is seen as a purely arithmetical theory (as it was in fact 
intended by Cantor and most of his successors). Yet, in order to 
construct an axiomatic foundation for set theory, the aid of an 
underlying logic is required. Does this mean that logic in itself can 
provide a sufficient foundation for set theory (or mathematics)?  
• Whereas Russell (1956:v) claims that logic and mathematics are 
identical, and even made an attempt to derive the number 
concept from the logical class concept, it has already been 
indicated in this article that this entire procedure begs the 
question. The claims of logicism are untenable because both the 
logical class concept as well as the Axiom of Infinity make an 
appeal to the basic meaning of number. In other words, the 
meaning of analysis (i.e the logical-analytical mode of reality) 
presupposes the meaning of number and therefore cannot serve 
as a foundation for it. 
From the preceding analysis and argumentation it may therefore be 
concluded that the pretended foundation of set theory in logic 
attempts to side-step the crucial issue. In order to provide an 
axiomatic foundation for an analysis of the meaning of number an 
                                           
11 The former (also known as the Axiom of Separation) states that for any set a 
and any condition B(x) on x there exists the set that contains just those 
members x of a which fulfil the condition B(x), while the latter (the Axiom of 
Infinity :  InfAx) secures the existence of infinite sets by postulating them (cf. 
Fraenkel et al., 1973:46). Presently the discussion will return to the form of the 
InfAx. 
12 For the purposes of the present discussion the Axiom Schema of 
Replacement/Substitution, the Axiom of Choice and the Axiom Schema of 
Foundation will be left aside. 
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underlying logic is required which in itself presupposes this basic 
meaning of number! 
As already pointed out this view already follows from the inevitable 
presence of quantifiers and the presence of a multiplicity of 
(constants and) variables assumed in first-order predicate calculus. 
The intuition (basic awareness) of multiplicity is made possible by 
the unique quantitative meaning of the numerical aspect of reality – 
first of all accounted for in a systematic mathematical understanding 
of the natural numbers and in the fact that succession is also 
inherent to our comprehension of natural numbers (the best known 
mathematical “application” of this order of succession is found in 
[mathematical/complete] induction).  
According to Freudenthal, Dedekind perhaps was the first mathe-
matician (cf. Dedekind, 1887: par. 59, 80) to call the conclusion from 
n to n + 1 complete induction (vollständige Induktion). Neither 
Bernoulli nor Pascal is the founder of this principle. Its discovery 
must be credited to Francesco Maurolico (1494-1575) (cf. 
Freundenthal, 1940:17). In a mathematical context, where “bad 
induction” is supposed to be excluded (as Freundenthal remarks – 
1940:37), no adjective is necessary to qualify the term induction. 
Already in 1922 Skolem had a solid understanding of these issues: 
Those engaged in doing set theory are normally convinced that 
the concept of an integer ought to be defined and that complete 
induction must be proved. Yet it is clear that one cannot define 
or provide an endless foundation; sooner or later one 
encounters what is indefinable and what cannot be proved. The 
only option left is to ensure that the first starting points are 
immediately clear, natural and beyond doubt. The concept of an 
integer and the inferences by induction meet this condition, but 
it is definitely not met by the set theoretic axioms such as those 
of Zermelo or similar ones. If one wishes to derive the former 
concepts from the latter, then the set theoretic concepts ought 
to be simpler and employing them then ought to be more certain 
than working with complete induction – but this contradict the 
real state of affairs totally (Skolem, 1979 [1929]:70).13 
                                           
13 “Die Mengentheoretiker sind gewöhnlich der Ansicht, dass der Begriff der 
ganzen Zahl definiert werden soll, und die vollständige Induktion bewiesen 
werden soll. Es ist aber klar, dass man nicht ins Unendliche definieren oder 
begründen kann; früher oder später kommt man zu dem nicht weiter 
Definierbaren bzw. Beweisbaren. Es ist dann nur darum zu tun, dass die ersten 
Anfangsgründe etwas unmittelbar Klares, Natürliches und Unzweifelhaftes sind. 
Diese Bedingung ist für den Begriff der ganzen Zahl und die Induktionsschlüsse 
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4. The primacy of natural numbers and their succession 
(induction) 
The intuition of one, another one, and so on, generates the most 
basic meaning of infinity – literally without an end, endlessly, 
infinitely. The awareness of a multiplicity is at least accompanied by 
an awareness of succession.14  
Weyl states that the startingpoint of mathematics is the series of 
natural numbers, the law according to which the number 1 is brought 
forth from nothing and where every number in turn gives rise to its 
successor (Weyl, 1921:57). On the next page Weyl calls the “always 
another one” the original mathematical intuition (die mathematische 
Urintuition) – it is not possible and it is not required to provide a 
further foundation for this Urintution (basal intuition). Upon this basis 
Weyl categorically holds that from the intuitionistic standpoint 
complete induction secures mathematics from being an enormous 
tautology and impregnates its statements as synthetic (non-
analytic).15 
With reference to Weyl also Skolem accentuates the fact that the 
concept of an integer and of induction constitutes the logical content 
of Hilbert’s metamathematics.16 Number displays an order of 
                                                                                                                           
erfüllt, aber entschieden nicht erfüllt für mengentheoretische Axiome der 
Zermelo'schen Art oder ähnliches; sollte man die Zurückführung der ersteren 
Begriffe auf die letzteren anerkennen, so müssten die mengentheoretischen 
Begriffe einfacher sein und das Denken mit ihnen unzweifelhafter als die 
vollständige Induktion, aber das läuft dem wirklichen Sachverhalt gänzlich 
zuwider. 
14 Kant realised that succession differs from causation: day succeeds night and  
night succeeds day, but neither day nor night causes night or day. It shall be 
argued below that whenever a multiplicity is grasped collectively (i.e., at once), 
an appeal is made to our intuition of space. 
15 “Unabhängig aber davon, welchen Wert man dieser letzten Reduktion des 
mathematischen Denkens auf die Zweieinigkeit beimißt, erscheint vom 
intuitionistischen Standpunkt die vollständige Induktion als dasjenige, was die 
Mathematik davon bewahrt, eine ungeheure Tautologie zu sein, und prägt ihren 
Behauptungen einen synthetischen, nicht-analytischen Charakter auf” (Weyl, 
1966:86). 
16 “In der Tat basiert sich ja Hilbert sehr wesentlich auf dem Begriff der ganzen 
Zahl und der vollständigen Induktion in der Metamathematik, und diese stellt ja 
den logischen Inhalt seiner Theorie dar” (Skolem, 1929:89). What Skolem calls 
the “logical content” actually refers to the primitive meaning of number which is 
presupposed in logic – an insight also emphasised by Weyl (see the main text 
below and the next footnote). 
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succession that is embodied in the application of induction. It is 
therefore significant that De Morgan already in 1838 used the 
equivalent expression successive induction (cf. Freundenthal, 
1940:36-37). Weyl does not stop to emphasise that mathematics in 
its entirety, even regarding the logical form in which it operates, is 
dependent upon the essence of natural numbers.17 
5. Wholeness and totality – the irreducibility of the whole-
parts relation 
Although the terms whole and totality are closely related to the term 
continuity it seems difficult to define the meaning of continuous 
extension (as realised by Dantzig, 1947:167 – see also Strauss, 
2002). Synonyms like uninterrupted, connected, coherent, and so 
on, simply repeat what is meant by continuity, instead of defining it. 
Yet, that a “continuous” whole allows for an infinite number of 
divisions was already discovered by the Greeks. Zeno’s B Fr. 3 
reads as follows: 
If things are a multiplicity, then it is necessary that their number 
must be identical to their actual multiplicity, neither more nor 
less. But if there are just as many as there are, then their 
number must be limited (finite). If things are a multiplicity, then 
necessarily they are infinite in number; for in that case between 
any two individual things there will always be other things and 
so on. Therefore, then, their number is infinite. 
The assumption that things are many serves two opposite 
conclusions. Apparently the two sides of the (spatial) whole-parts 
relation provide the foundation for this argument. If the multiplicity of 
the first section refers to the many parts of the world as a whole, it 
stands to reason that taken together they constitute the unity of the 
world as a whole (and that their number would be limited). If, on the 
other hand, one starts with the whole and then tries to account for its 
parts, one must keep in mind that between any two of the many 
parts there will always be other, indicating an infinity of them. 
Fränkel explicitly uses the whole-parts relation to explain the 
meaning of this fragment (Fränkel, 1968:425 ff., 430). 
If this interpretation is sound, then Zeno not only understood 
something of the whole-parts relation, but also, for the first time, 
                                           
17 “Die Mathematik ist ganz und gar, sogar den logischen Formen nach, in denen 
sie sich bewegt, abhängig vom Wesen der natürlichen Zahl” (Weyl, 1921:70). 
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realised that the feature of infinite divisibility characterises spatial 
continuity. This perspective also supports the interpretation given to 
Zeno's B Fragment 1 by Hasse and Scholz (1928:10-13). This first 
fragment (which we inherited from Simplicius) states that if there is a 
multiplicity, then it must be simultaneously large and small; large up 
to infinity and small up to nothingness. Hasse and Scholz clarify this 
fragment by interpreting this view as follows:  
If it is permissible to conceptualize a line-stretch as an 
aggregate of infinitely many small line stretches, then there are 
two and only two possibilities. Every basic line segment either 
has a finite size (larger than zero), in which case the aggregate 
of line-stretches transcends every finite line-stretch; or the 
supposed line-stretches are zero-stretches in the strict sense of 
the word, in which case the composed line is also a zero-
stretch, because the combination of zero-stretches can always 
only produce a zero-stretch, however large the number of zero-
stretches used may be18 (Hasse & Scholz, 1928:11). 
Besides the fact that the two mentioned fragments of Zeno can be 
rendered perfectly intelligible by using the whole-parts relation, 
further support for this understanding may also be drawn from the 
account which Aristotle gave of Zeno’s arguments (cf. Metaph. 233 
a 13 ff. and 239 b 5 ff.; see Aristotle, 2001). One of the standard 
expositions of Zeno's argumentation against the reality of motion is 
completely dependent on the employment of the whole-parts relation 
with its implied trait of infinite divisibility. Guthrie (1980:91-92) 
explains this argument by saying that according to Zeno 
[m]otion is impossible because an object moving between any 
two points A and B must always cover half the distance before it 
gets to the end. But before covering half the distance it must 
cover half of the half, and so ad infinitum. Thus to traverse any 
distance at all it must cover an infinite number of points, which 
is impossible in any finite time. 
For the larger part of 2000 years continuity (with its implied whole-
parts relation), dominated the scene – both within the domains of 
philosophy and mathematics. Early modernity witnessed atomistic 
theories of nature, but only in the course of the nineteenth century it 
penetrated the mathematical treatment of continuity. Bolzano 
                                           
18 It can be argued that Grünbaum, with the aid of non-denumerable sets, 
attempted to side-step the last remark in order to accomplish an assumed 
complete arithmetisation of the continuum. 
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explored an atomistic approach and it was brought to fruition by 
Weierstrass, Dedekind and Cantor.  
The new assumption in the approach of Weierstrass holds that we 
have to define limits in terms of a static domain encompassing all 
real numbers. Boyer (1959:286) refers to this in the following 
explanation: 
In making the basis of the calculus more rigorously formal, 
Weierstrass also attacked the appeal to the intuition of 
continuous motion which is implied in Cauchy’s expression – 
that a variable approaches a limit. Previous writers generally 
had defined a variable as a quantity or magnitude which is not 
constant; but since the time of Weierstrass it has been 
recognized that the ideas of variable and limit are not 
essentially phoronomic, but involve purely static considerations. 
Weierstrass interpreted a variable x simply as a letter 
designating any one of a collection of numerical values. A 
continuous variable was likewise defined in terms of static 
considerations: If for any value xo of the set and for any 
sequence of positive numbers d1, d2, ..., dn, however small, 
there are in the intervals xo – di, xo + di others of the set, this is 
called continuous. 
Weyl characterises the apparent success of this new aim to 
arithmetise mathematics as atomistic (Weyl, 1921:56, 72). Accord-
ing to him within a continuum it is certainly possible, through 
divisions, to generate partial continua, but it is not clever 
(unvernünftig) to assert that the total continuum is composed of the 
limits and these partial continua. “A true continuum after all coheres 
within itself and cannot be divided into separate pieces; it contradicts 
its essence.”19 Weyl mentions that he changed his own view by 
accepting the position taken by Brouwer in this regard. Nonetheless, 
one does not have to adhere to the intuitionistic understanding of 
(infinity and) continuity to realise that the whole-parts relation and 
the totality-character of continuity stands in the way of a complete 
arithmetisation of continuity (the outcome of an atomistic approach). 
                                           
19 “Erscheint dies dem heutigen Mathematiker mit seiner atomistischen 
Denkgewöhnung anstößig, so war es in früheren Zeiten eine allen 
selbstverständliche Ansicht: innerhalb eines Kontinuums lassen sich wohl durch 
Grenzsetzung Teilkontinuen erzeugen; es ist aber unvernünftig, zu behaupten, 
daß das totale Kontinuum aus der Grenze und jenen Teilkontinuen 
zusammengesetzt sei. Ein wahrhaftes Kontinuum ist eben ein in sich 
Zusammenhängendes und kann nicht in getrennte Bruchstücke aufgeteilt 
werden; das widerstreitet seinem Wesen” (Weyl, 1921:73). 
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Paul Bernays, the co-worker of David Hilbert, senses the 
irreducibility of the spatial whole-parts relation (i.e. the totality 
feature of spatial continuity) with an astonishing lucidity. He asserts 
that the property of being a totality “undeniably belongs to the 
geometric idea of the continuum. And it is this characteristic which 
resists a complete arithmetization of the continuum”.20 
Compare his remark in a different context where he objects that the 
classical foundation of real numbers given by Cantor and Dedekind 
does not “manifest a complete arithmetization” (Bernays, 1976:187-
188). To this he adds the remark: “It is in any case doubtful whether 
a complete arithmetization of the idea of the continuum could be 
justified. The idea of the continuum is any way originally a 
geometrical idea” (Bernays, 1976:188). 
Something remarkable emerges from this situation. If the nature of 
totality (wholeness/the whole-parts relation) cannot be arithmetised 
how does one explain the entailed property of being infinitely 
divisible? Does this property imply that the (numerical) intuition of 
succession (literally without an end/endless/infinite) is an 
indispensible building block of continuity? Does it therefore mean 
that “number” is “built into” the nature of the (spatial) meaning of 
“continuity”? 
6. Conclusion 
As is evident from the history of mathematics and from what has 
been argued in connection with alternative trends within 
mathematics it can be concluded that this discipline (similarly to 
every other intellectual concern) constantly had to face the problem 
of uniqueness and coherence, particularly in its diverging responses 
to the primitive terms involved. Since axiomatic set theory assumes 
an underlying logic without critically accounting for the ontological 
assumptions operative in this logic, it actually conceals its own 
important ontological presuppositions. The on-going pendulum-shift 
between arithmeticistic and geometricistic21 strategies within 
mathematics ought to be confronted with a third option not yet 
explored in the history of mathematics, that is acknowledging both 
                                           
20 “Und es ist auch dieser Charakter, der einer vollkommenen Arithmetisierung 
des Kontinuums entgegensteht” (Bernays, 1976:74). 
21 Ultimately the one-sidedness of monistic -isms like these demonstrate the 
negative effects of deifying some or other aspect of created reality. Christian 
scholarship is called to avoid such absolutisations. 
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the uniqueness of multiplicity and wholeness (number and space) 
while accounting for their mutual coherence.  
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